This paper examines whether financial restatements are associated with subsequent auditor changes. A financial restatement represents a breakdown in a company's financial reporting but importantly also of its audit. We argue that in response to pressure from capital markets, restating firms will dismiss their auditors to increase audit quality and restore reputational capital lost when the restatements are announced to the investing public. Using a large sample of restatements and auditor changes we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, the likelihood of auditor-client realignments increases after firms announce restatements. As expected, we also find that the positive association between restatements and auditor turnovers is more pronounced when restatements are more severe and the quality of corporate governance is high. Finally, we find that stock market returns surrounding auditor changes increase as the severity of restatements increases. The last result supports the idea that stock markets have a positive view of auditor changes following restatements.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between restatements of financial statements and subsequent auditor changes. We posit that a restatement destabilizes the relationship between external auditors and their clients because shareholders view a restatement, at least in part, as an audit failure (Liu et al. 2009; Raghunandan et al. 2003; Turner 1999) . Depending on the incentives and disincentives of both parties, we argue that a termination of their relationship could occur.
According to Government Accountability Office (GAO 2002) , the number of restatements has not only been steadily increasing, but over the period 1997 to 2002 financial markets lost more than $100 billion in market capitalization due to the restatements. In a follow-up study, the GAO (2006) documented that the number of public companies restating financial statements grew from 3.7 percent in 2002 to 6.8 percent in 2005.
Restatements raise questions about management's integrity, the adequacy of a firm's internal controls, 3 the effectiveness of the audit committee, and also the external auditor's independence and audit quality (Gleason et al. 2008) . Kinney et al. (2004) , among others, argue that a financial restatement is viewed by markets not only as a failure in financial reporting by management, but importantly as an auditing failure.
Dismissing the external auditor following a restatement is a highly visible action that companies can take to possibly restore market confidence and improve audit oversight over the financial reporting process. Liu et al. (2009) find that shareholders of 3 3 restating companies ratify resolutions against external auditors calling for their dismissal.
However, auditors can also be expected to assign blame for the restatements to their clients and in some cases will sever ties to preserve the audit firm's reputation and reduce its litigation exposure (Feldmann et al. 2009 ). 4 As a result auditor dismissals and resignations, both, are likely to occur after companies announce financial restatements.
Using a large sample of firms, we find that restatements are an important predictor of auditor changes in the following year. We find that as the severity of a restatement increases, the likelihood of an auditor change also increases. Also, consistent with a restatement constituting an audit failure, we find that restating firms having strong governance are more likely to change auditors than other firms. These results hold after controlling for other determinants of auditor changes including the amount of audit fees paid, the level of auditor-conservatism, and client-firms' incentives to look for other auditors.
Similar to restatements, auditor changes are important events that are closely scrutinized by markets. Because the underlying reasons for an auditor change are often not publicly disclosed, empirically documenting reasons for client-auditor realignments increases our understanding of these events. Our study suggests that the recent increases in auditor changes may be partly attributable to the increases in financial restatements.
When an auditor change occurs (resignations and dismissals), there is generally a negative stock market reaction to the change. This is because an auditor change often signals the presence of weak internal controls and/or disagreements with the incumbent auditor, and because the successive auditor is often of lower quality and prone to making mistakes in the first years of the engagement (Hackenbrack and Hogan 2002; Johnson et al. 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004) .
However, an auditor change that is in response to an audit failure may not be accompanied by a negative reaction from markets. To the extent that an auditor change restores the company's reputation damaged by a restatement and increases audit oversight, investors could view the change positively. We explore this idea by examining abnormal returns surrounding auditor changes of restating firms. We find a positive stock market reaction which suggests that for restating firms the benefits exceed the generally high costs associated with auditor changes. This result is consistent with a line of research showing that firms improve their governance mechanisms following accounting failures (Farber 2005; Srinivasan 2005; Desai et al. 2006; Wilson 2010) .
The remainder of this study comprises four sections. The next section reviews the relevant literature and develops our hypotheses. This is followed by a discussion of the research design and the empirical results. The last section concludes the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
A restatement occurs when a company, either voluntarily or prompted by auditors or regulators, revises previously reported financial information. The announcement of a restatement is made in a press release or on a Form 8-K, and typically results in the filing of an amended financial report on Forms 10-K/A or 10-Q/A.
Restatements constitute a public acknowledgement that the reported financial statements are not consistent with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and represent the most visible evidence of improper accounting .
Financial restatements undermine investor confidence in financial reporting and reduce 5 5 market efficiency (SEC 2002 Prior research also documents that there are negative consequences arising from restatements to companies' management and boards. Desai et al. (2006) and Agrawal and Cooper (2007) show that restating firms experience a higher turnover in top management relative to other firms. Srinivasan (2005) finds that following a material restatement there is a higher probability of turnover in the audit committee whose responsibility it is to oversee the firm's financial reporting process.
A financial restatement, however, constitutes not just a breakdown in a company's financial reporting process but importantly, also in its auditing. For example, Stanley and DeZoort (2007) argue that financial restatements due to errors or fraud are de facto auditing failures; Turner (1999) , the former chief accountant of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), notes that the SEC considers restatements as constituting audit lapses; and Larcker and Richardson (2004) argue that a restatement that is the result of earnings management by the firm constitutes an audit failure because the firm's external auditor did not prevent the deception. 6 6 Consistent with this, research finds that restatements lead investors to have a more negative view about their firms' auditors (Byrnes et al. 2002) . Fuerman (2000) finds more shareholder litigation against auditors of restating firms, while Liu et al. (2009) document that shareholders are more likely to vote against the ratification of an auditor of a restating firm.
Changing auditors would potentially allow a firm to deflect blame for the restatement to its auditor, restore the firm's tarnished image, regain the market's confidence in its financial reporting and increase audit oversight. 5 In addition, restating firms can possibly mitigate the intensity of SEC enforcement by dismissing their incumbent auditors. For example, Leone and Liu (2010) note that SEC enforcement and penalties are less severe when restating firms take corrective actions following restatements.
On the other hand, the costs of switching audit firms are substantial. Incoming auditors face a steep learning curve and tend to provide a lower quality of assurance in the early years of auditing their clients' operations (Johnson et al. 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004) . 6 Clients also face a limited choice of auditors that specialize in their industry and are also close to corporate headquarters (Agrawal and Cooper 2007) . Finally, only a low percentage of shareholders actually vote against an auditor's ratification (2.15%) and their votes are nonbinding (Liu et al. 2009 ). Therefore, depending on the 5 However, auditors also can initiate the separation. Auditors actively engage in client portfolio risk management to lower the probability of future audit failures. For instance, auditors adjust their client portfolios to reduce overall exposure to client litigation by simply resigning from engagements that pose a high litigation risk, for example client-firms that have restatements (Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Shu 2000) . Prior studies show that auditors increasingly resign from risky clients rather than simply adjusting audit procedures or audit fees (Johnstone 2000; Bockus and Gigler 1998) . 6 The GAO (2003) also reports that it takes an audit firm at least two or three years to become adequately acquainted with a client's operations. 
RESEARCH DESIGN Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events relevant to our study: upon discovery of a misstatement or irregularity associated with a past period, a restatement of the financial statements is announced by the company and, for some firms, the announcements are followed by auditor changes. As Figure 1 shows, we design our test procedures to focus on auditor changes in the fiscal year following the year during which the restatement announcement was made. For restating firms that change their auditors, the median duration between a restatement announcement and the auditor change is 359 days.
(Insert FIGURE 1 Here) Table 2 provides descriptive data on the 1,807 firm-years in our sample where restatements occurred. Included are firms with multiple restatement announcements. Firms with exactly two restatements are 17% of the sample, those with more than two restatements are 2.5% and the remainder (80.5%) consists of firms having a single restatement. As with auditor changes, the number of restatement announcements are trending upwards, a pattern also documented in prior studies (Scholz 2008; Files et al. 2011; Burks 2011) . Panel C also groups restatements according to whether they decrease net income (NEGEFFECT), increase net income (POSEFFECT) or have no effect on net income (NOEFFECT). 9 Of the three categories, the largest is NEGEFFECT which is considered to be the most severe category of restatements (Agrawal and Cooper 2007) .
As in Ettredge et al. (2009) , we also regard restatements accompanied by negative stock returns as more severe than those followed by non-negative stock returns. 10 Panel D
of Table 2 shows that there are 1,337 firm-years for which stock market returns were available on the restatement announcement dates. Of these restatements with positive returns constitute about 42% of the sample, which is comparable to findings in Scholz (2008).
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(Insert TABLE 2 Here)
Auditor Change Model
We model the likelihood of an auditor change as a function of one-period lagged restatements and a set of predetermined lagged control variables used by previous 9 We defined a NOEFFECT restatement as occurring when a restatement only involved reclassifications in the income, cash flow or balance sheet statements, footnotes and segment disclosures, where negative and positive changes of net income offset each other, where there was no dollar impact on the income statement, and where specific amounts were not provided in the restatement announcement. Most of the restatements in this category involved reclassifications and changes in footnote or segments disclosures (about 70%). 10 Following Collins et al. (2009), we use the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns for the three day window (i.e., [-1, +1]) surrounding the restatement announcement date. We subtract the CRSP equally weighted index (with dividends) from a company's daily return to obtain the market-adjusted abnormal return for each firm. 11 While it may seem surprising to observe positive returns upon announcements of restatements, suggest that the discovery of the accounting irregularity leading to a restatement could indicate that the company's internal controls are working and/or there is effective audit committee oversight.
studies. 12 We relate auditor changes to restatements in the previous year rather than the current year, because we want to rule out the possibility that the restatements may have occurred at the urging of the new auditor (Lazer et al. 2004) . A variation of the model below considers the severity of restatements.
The first set of control variables relates to auditor characteristics: 1) auditor going concern and modified opinion (GC and MODOP), 2) short and long auditor tenure 14 We also include controls for clients' financial risks. Because less profitable firms (proxied by return on assets, ROA), firms with losses (LOSS) and highly leveraged firms (LVRG) are considered risky (Schloetzer 2007 ), we predict a higher likelihood of an auditor change in these companies. Therefore, LOSS and LVRG are expected to have positive coefficients, while a negative coefficient is predicted for ROA. Stice (1991) argues that high growth firms (GROWTH) pose additional risks for auditors because these 12 Note that all the independent variables are measured one year prior the year of the auditor change to control for potential endogeneity or simultaneity bias. We assume that the economic determinants were in place before the auditor change was made. 13 Auditor tenure is denoted as short-term (STTEN) if it is less than 4 years and long-term (LTTEN) if it is longer than 8 years, following Johnson et al. (2002) . 14 Following Knechel et al. (2007), we measure each auditor's industry market share using clients' sales for each two-digit primary Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code in Compustat . Prior research has used 10 percent, 15 percent, and 20 percent thresholds during years in which there were Big 8, Big 6, and Big 5 auditors present, respectively (Knechel et al. 2007 ). We use a 30 percent threshold which ensures that the all of the Big 4 firms are not classified as industry specialists (e.g., Mayhew and Wilkins 2003) . We find qualitatively similar results to those reported when we use thresholds of 35 percent and 40 percent.
firms tend to have less effective internal control systems. Therefore, GROWTH is expected to be positively related to auditor changes.
Client-firms having large negative discretionary accruals, DA (a proxy for auditor conservatism) have incentives to dismiss the incumbent auditors in the hope of finding a more "reasonable" successor auditor (DeFond and Subramanyan 1998). This predicts a negative association between auditor changes and DA. greater is audit effort that is required (Bamber et al. 1993 ). Therefore, with increased audit complexity, the probability of a auditor-client realignment occurring is also greater.
Audit complexity is proxied by number of segments (SEG) measured as the number of reportable segments of a client and as the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (FRGN).
Because the costs of changing auditors are higher for large clients (DeAngelo 1981), we predict a negative coefficient on firm size (SIZE). Finally, year and industry dummies are included as controls in the model.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 3 presents a comparison of the variables used in our tests for restating and non-restating firms. 16 Firms announcing restatements appear to have riskier and more complex operations, and also appear to pose higher risks for the auditor.
Specifically, these firms are associated with more unclean auditor opinions, shorter auditor tenure and have higher values for: audit fees, losses, leverage, growth, number of segments and negative discretionary accruals. Restating firms also tend to be larger in size than the control group of non-restating firms. Interestingly, in the pre-SOX period, restatement firms were smaller than the average firm on Compustat (Scholz 2008 ).
Panel B of Table 3 provides a comparison of variables for restating firms that change auditors and those that do not. Consistent with prior research, firms that change auditors are smaller in size, are less profitable and are more risky (i.e., greater leverage).
As expected, these firms also appear to have greater incentives to change their auditors.
Specifically, they have: a higher frequency of going concern opinions, pay higher audit fees, fewer industry expert auditors and more negative discretionary accruals.
Panel B also shows that restating firms that change auditors report larger amounts of restatements. The mean restatement amounts (RESTAMT) expressed as a percentage of total assets are -2.32% versus -1.04% for restating firms that change auditors and those that do not, respectively. 17 Restating firms that change auditors are also associated with larger negative abnormal stock market returns (CARREST) during a three day window around the restatement announcements compared to those that keep their auditors (means 16 All continuous variables in Table 3 are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the effects of extreme values on the test results. 17 Restatement amounts (RESTAMT) are measured as the cumulative earnings effect of the restatement scaled by total assets as of the fiscal year-end prior to the restatement announcement Files et al. 2009 of CARREST are -0.0227 and -0.0087, respectively). These results are consistent with the idea that as the severity of restatements increases, the likelihood of an auditor change also increases. For both groups, on average, a restatement announcement resulted in corrections to five prior quarters of financial statements (RESTYR). There is no statistical difference between the two groups in the number of prior quarters subject to restatements.
Panel C of Table 3 shows the mean auditor turnover for restating firms in the years before and after a restatement announcement. The mean auditor turnover in the years t-4 through t-2 for restating firms is lower than the overall mean auditor turnover rate of 9.2% for the non-restating (control) firms. However, in the year preceding the restatement (t-1) and in the years following (until year t+4) the mean auditor turnover of restating firms is higher than this overall mean. The higher auditor turnover in year t-1 supports results in Lazer et al. (2004) who find that restatements occur in the year following an auditor switch at the urging of the new auditor. Our study, however, documents a new result, namely that a higher level of auditor turnover also occurs following a restatement, from year t+1 (14.5%) through year t+4 (10.3%).
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In Panel D of Table 3 , we present univariate test results regarding our hypotheses.
In support of our main hypothesis H1A, we find that firms having financial restatements are more likely to change auditors. The mean of the auditor switch variable for the restating firms in year t+1 (14.5%) is statistically significantly higher at the 1% level 18 The results for years t+2 onwards have to be interpreted with the caveat that we lose observations when we lead and lag years for auditor changes relative to a restatement announcement. This is because our dataset consists of restatement announcements during 2000-2005 and auditor changes during [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . For example, with regard to a restatement announcement in 2005, we only have subsequent auditor change data for 2006 (year t+1). Auditor change data for years t+2, t+3 and t+4 are not in our dataset for 2005 restatement announcements. We also note that as we move farther away from the restatement announcement year, the confounding effects from other factors on auditor changes increase. For both of these reasons, in our main tests, we only consider auditor changes in fiscal year t+1. We thank a reviewer for pointing out this issue.
from the overall mean auditor turnover rate for the non-restating firms (9.2%). The severe restatement group of firms, defined using income and stock return proxies, is linked to higher auditor changes which supports hypothesis H1B. Finally, supporting hypothesis H2, there are more auditor switches in restating firms having higher quality corporate governance (14%) than in the remainder of the firms (4.7%). 
Restatement Announcements and Auditor Changes
Model 1 estimation results show support for the main hypothesis, H1A. We find that restatements are positively associated with auditor switches: the coefficient on REST, a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if there is a restatement and zero otherwise, is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect of REST on the likelihood of an auditor switch is 0.0397, which suggests that the announcement of a restatement increases the probability of an auditor switch by approximately 4 percent.
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The computed marginal effect potentially understates the effect of a restatement on auditor turnover because our tests only analyze auditor changes in the subsequent year (t+1).
Restatements For Non-substantive/Technical reasons
Using firms with restatements for technical reasons as a test group and nonrestating firms as a control group, we similarly examine whether restatement announcements also lead to a higher frequency of auditor changes. We find an insignificant association between these types of restatements and auditor switches (results are untabulated) which provides additional support for hypothesis H1A that only restatements due to substantive reasons result in auditor switches.
Restatements and Type of Auditor Change
We also estimate a multinomial logistic regression to examine whether different types of auditor changes have different determinants. Using the "no-auditor change" as the reference category, we allow our dependent variable to have the following four outcomes based on the four different types of auditor changes: Big N to Big N, Big N to 21 The marginal effect is the change in the estimated probability of an auditor switch corresponding to a unit change in a variable, holding all other variables constant at their sample mean values.
Non-Big N, Non-Big N to Big N, and Non-Big N to Non-Big N. We find positive and statistically significant coefficients (1% level of testing) on REST for the two outcomes representing the most frequently encountered types of auditor changes: Big N to Big N and Non-Big N to Non-Big N (results are not tabulated). Regarding the coefficients on the other determinants, we found results generally consistent with expectations, excepting for some associations relating to Big N to Non-Big N auditor changes.
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Overall, the above results support hypothesis, H1A. However, we acknowledge that the choice of the subsequent auditor may be endogeneous to our regression model(s), which represents a potential weakness of our study.
Severity of Restatements and Auditor Changes
While all substantive restatements represent a breakdown in the financial reporting process, those having a more negative effect on net income (Agrawal and Cooper 2007) and those followed by a more negative stock market reaction are regarded as more severe (Ettredge et al. 2009 ). The sample used for these tests consists only of restating firms with substantive restatements. In support of hypothesis H1B, estimation results for Models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 4 indicate that the more negative the restatement announcement return and the more negative the effect of the restatement on net income, the higher is the frequency of an auditor switch in the following year: the coefficients on CARREST and RESTAMT are negative and statistically significant when included individually and together, at least at the 10% level of significance. 23 We also consider that there is a more severe breakdown in financial reporting and auditing, in the group of firms having multiple restatements (Files et al. 2011 ). However, in both univariate and the regression tests, we do not find that auditor turnover in these firms is statistically different from that in firms with single restatements (results not tabulated).
As for the control variables, with the exception of return on assets and leverage, we find associations that are consistent with expectations. Specifically, we find that switching firms are smaller, and tend to have: a higher frequency of going concern/modified opinions, a lengthier relationship with their auditors, higher audit fees, a non-industry expert as their auditor, more M&A activity and more segments.
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(Insert TABLE 4 Here)
Logistic Regressions for Corporate Governance and Auditor Changes
Firms are reluctant to switch auditors because there are adverse consequences associated with auditor changes. Therefore, on the one hand, it is possible that firms having strong governance will seek to avoid the negative consequences that follow auditor changes and will be less likely to dismiss their auditors. 25 On the other hand, we should expect well-governed firms to take prompt action to restore their firms'
reputations by dismissing the auditors for their failure to detect accounting irregularities (Weisbach 1998; Borokhovich et al. 1996) .
NEGRET and POSRET are positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient on NEGRET is more than twice as large and is statistically significantly larger at the 1% level in a Chi-square test. Additionally, only the coefficient on NEGEFFECT is statistically significant at the 1 % level and the difference in the coefficients for NEGEFFECT (most severe restatement) and POSEFFECT (least severe restatement) is statistically significant at the 1% level. Before we discuss our tests, there is a potential endogeneity issue to be addressed.
While we argue that increased governance should lead to more dismissed auditors, it is also possible that higher governance should also lead to fewer restatements. However, Larcker et al. (2007) document that accounting restatements are not related to governance proxies that include board characteristics, stock ownership of insiders, institutional ownership, activist stockownership, executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables.
On the other hand, in an unpublished working paper, Baber et al. (2009) document that restatements occur more frequently in firms with weak corporate governance.
There is, therefore, mixed evidence on the endogeneity between the restatements and corporate governance. Additionally, in contrast to the above research, we are interested in examining the responsiveness of corporate governance after an irregularity occurs. We argue that once an irregularity is discovered, companies with higher quality governance can be expected to take corrective actions by dismissing their auditors. We measure the effectiveness of corporate governance at the start of the year during which there was an auditor change. Our proxy, therefore, should reflect changes to external and board governance that may have occurred since the restatement, mitigating the impact of the endogeneity, if any, on our results.
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Our proxy for measuring effective governance is a governance index (GOV)
proposed by DeFond et al. (2005) . The following six variables are included in the index: 1) board size; 2) board independence; 3) audit committee size; 4) audit committee 26 As a test of sensitivity, we also include a dummy variable proxying for CEO and/or CFO turnover during the year of the auditor change. This variable was obtained from ExecuComp. We do not report results including this variable because the coefficient on this variable was not statistically significant and because this variable is only available for a subset of firms in our sample; ExecuComp appears to only provide comprehensive coverage mostly for the S&P 500 firms.
independence; 5) institutional ownership; and 6) the G-index. 27 A score of one is assigned to each of the six variables when a governance attribute is present and 0 when it is absent. The scores are then aggregated to obtain a composite governance index. The merit of this index is that it captures not only the independence and effectiveness of the full board and its audit committee but also the monitoring by institutional investors and the extent of management's entrenchment (e.g., protections against hostile takeovers).
Panel A of Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on the governance index and its components. The mean and median values of GOV are 3.14 and 3, respectively. Firms with good governance are defined as those having GOV values that are greater than the median value of 3. For these tests, we use a sub-sample (3,689 observations) for which the governance variables are available on the RiskMetrics.
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Model 1 in Panel B shows estimation results when the governance index is included in the logistic regression. 29 As expected, the coefficient on the test variable, REST, is positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level of testing. Since
RiskMetrics only covers the S&P 1500 firms, our main hypothesis, H1A, therefore, appears to be also confirmed for the larger publicly traded firms.
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Effective corporate governance can make it difficult for management to dismiss their auditors opportunistically (Agrawal and Cooper 2007) . Consistent with this, we find 27 The G index, developed by Gompers et al. (2003) , is a composite index of 24 provisions that represents the level of shareholder protection or conversely the level of managerial entrenchment. High values of the G index represent a high level of management entrenchment, for example protection to management from takeovers (i.e., weak governance). 28 From the RiskMetrics database, we select variables representing the various governance characteristics of a firm. In addition, we obtain institutional ownership from Thompson Reuters (CDA/Spectrum) database. 29 Following Engel et al. (2010) , we exclude utilities since regulated firms have different corporate governance structures than firms in non-regulated industries. However, the inclusion of the industry does not alter significantly any results documented. 30 The results from using the S&P 1500 firms may not be generalizable to all U.S. public firms to the extent that the S&P 1500 firms differ systematically from all other firms. Firms on the S&P, however, represent approximately 85% of market capitalization of all publicly traded firms (Baber et al. 2009 ). Our tests, therefore, include firms that represent an economically significant portion of the entire market.
that GOV is negatively related to auditor turnover (p<0.0001). More importantly, however, in support of Hypothesis H2, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on REST*GOV (p=0.0021), which suggests that the association between restatements and subsequent auditor turnovers is more pronounced in firms with more effective governance.
In Model 2, we use individual components of the governance index as independent variables. Again, we find that the coefficient on REST is statistically significant (p=0.0307). The most interesting result here concerns the monitoring provided by the audit committee. We find a negative and statistical significant coefficient on RACBD which indicates that large audit committees are associated with a lower frequency of auditor switches. This is consistent with large audit committees providing better monitoring of their companies' financial reporting and auditing, in turn reducing the likelihood of opportunistic dismissals of auditors by management. However, after a restatement announcement, supporting hypothesis, H2, larger audit committees are associated with a higher frequency of auditor changes (REST*RACBD).
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Overall, results in Table 5 suggest that firms having good governance and effective audit committees will take corrective steps to restore auditor oversight and their companies' reputations tarnished by the restatements.
(Insert TABLE 5 Here) Stock Market Reaction to Auditor Changes
While the underlying reasons are rarely revealed in a Form 8-K, auditor changes generally occur after "negative events" including a client's refusal to accept a qualified audit opinion, evidence of an illegal act, or impaired auditor independence. In support, prior studies find a negative market reaction to an auditor change (Griffin and Lont 2010; Knechel et al. 2007) . 32 However, an auditor change following a restatement could be a positive (or at least non-negative) event for investors if it represents the company's attempt to restore its tarnished reputation in the market place. 33 And, although the cost associated with an auditor change is high, as the severity of a restatement increases, the benefits to changing the auditor could exceed these costs.
To explore this idea, we estimate an OLS model using the stock market returns surrounding an auditor change for a restating firm. 34 The sample used for this test consists of firms that announced restatements and subsequently changed their auditors.
Following Knechel et al. (2007) , we eliminated seven observations for which there were confounding/concurrent news during a seven-day period (-3, 3) surrounding the date of auditor switch. These are firms that disclosed, during this window, their quarterly or annual earnings, or other significant corporate news.
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As restatements increase in severity, we expect that the net benefits to changing the auditor will also increase. Specifically, we predict that as the abnormal returns around 32 However, there are some studies that find no evidence of a market reaction (Johnson and Lys 1990; Klock 1994) . Klock (1994) find that the market does not react to 8-K's filed for a change in certifying accountant in a standard event-time test using data during 1986 -1987 . Johnson and Lys (1990 do not find a significant market reaction to disclosures of voluntary auditor changes. 33 Similar to our study, there is other research that finds positive abnormal returns on auditor switch dates (Carter and Soo 1999) . For example, Johnson and Lys (1990) suggest that auditor changes by management (especially dismissals) could be regarded as a positive event by investors to the extent that managers act in the best interest of shareholders 34 Following Knechel et al. (2007), we use auditor dismissal dates (as reported in Audit Analytics) rather than filing dates of 8-Ks to avoid potential confounding effects due to other events that are simultaneously reported in 8-K forms. 35 Other news includes shareholder lawsuits, officer/director changes, product introductions, merger related news and dividend announcements.
restatement announcements (CARREST) and the restatement amounts (RESTAMT)
become more negative, the abnormal returns surrounding the auditor change will become more positive. 
CARAC is the cumulative abnormal stock return over a three-day window surrounding the auditor change (-1, 1). We calculate abnormal stock returns by subtracting the CRSP equal-weighted market return from the firm's holding returns on each day and summing these returns over three days (Griffin and Lont 2010; Scholz 2008) . 37 As for the control variables, a negative market reaction is expected for firms having reportable disclosures, RPTE (Griffin and Long 2010; Whisenant et al. 2003) .
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Auditor changes late in the year (Q4) are predicted to be accompanied by a negative market reaction (Knechel et al. 2007; Hackenbrack and Hogan 2002) . Griffin and Lont (2010) find that auditor resignations (RSGN) experience more negative market returns than dismissals. Similar to Hennes et al. (2011) , we include a dummy variable for an audit performed by a Non-Big N auditor (NONBIG) prior to the auditor change. Hennes et al. argue that there is greater information asymmetry in client-firms having Non-Big N auditors and, therefore, an auditor change following a restatement for these firms will 36 We also included two additional proxies for severity of a restatement: multiple restatement firms and the lag between the restatement announcement and auditor change. Both of the variables were not statistically significantly related to CARAC (results not tabulated) 37 We find similar results when abnormal returns are based on a market model estimated using the CRSP value-weighted return over days -220 to -20 relative to the auditor turnover date (e.g., Baik et al. 2008) . 38 According to Audit Analytics, reportable disclosures (RPTE) include internal control reportable condition, scope limitation, financial restatement, audit opinion concerns, management not reliable, illegal acts, SEC investigation, SEC banned auditor, SEC inquiry regarding company or auditor, lack of independence, bankruptcy, existing public audits, PCAOB registration, incoming auditor will re-audit, fee reduction, incoming auditor approved by board, consulted with incoming auditor, and agreement or disagreement in auditor letter.
lead to a stronger market reaction. 39 The coefficient on GC (going concern opinion) is predicted to be negative. We do not have any prediction for the sign on firm size (SIZE).
Panel A of Table 6 shows univariate statistics for the variables used in the regression. The mean return around the auditor change is positive as expected. On average, each firm has approximately one reportable event. 31% of the observations consist of auditor resignations. 27% of auditor changes for the restating firms involve the Non-Big N auditors. Consistent with Hennes et al., we also find that there is higher auditor turnover in Non-Big auditors (22%) compared to Big 4 auditors (11%). 40 Finally, the univariate statistics show that about 8% of the firms have going concern opinions.
Our regression results in Panel B show that, consistent with expectations, the coefficients on CAREST and RESTAMT are negative and statistically significant.
Therefore, as the restatements increase in severity, investors view an auditor switch as being beneficial for the company. This is consistent with Wilson (2010) who finds that investors' confidence in the reported financial information increases when firms take corrective actions following restatements, thus demonstrating to investors their commitment to high-quality financial reporting. 41 Regarding the other variables, larger firms and restating firms that change auditors in the fourth quarter experience a more negative stock market reaction.
(Insert TABLE 6 Here) 39 As a test of sensitivity we also include the following four variables: B_B (Big N to Big N) , B_N (Big N to non-Big N) , N_N (non-Big N to non-Big N), are expected to be negative, while the coefficient on N_B (non-Big N to Big N) is expected to be positive. We find statistically insignificant coefficients on all of these variables (results not tabulated). 40 We obtained these percentages as follows: Of the sample of all restating firms, there were 524 firms audited by Non-Big N auditors and 117 of these switched their auditors (22%), while the remainder 1,283 restating firms were audited by Big N auditors and 145 of these switched their auditors (11%). 41 Specifically, Wilson (2010) finds that earnings response coefficients (ERC) for the group without auditor dismissal are significantly lower than the group with auditor dismissal for the period following restatements.
Resignations versus Dismissals
Rather than be dismissed, the external auditor could resign from an engagement to protect the audit firm's reputation and attempt to deflect blame on the company's management. There are at least two reasons why investors may not discriminate between an auditor resignation and a dismissal. First, to the extent that shareholders view a restatement as a breakdown in auditing, the form of the auditor change (resignation or dismissal) should not be relevant. Second, Lee et al. (2004) argue that there is often no difference between an auditor resignation and a dismissal because an audit firm can preemptively resign from an engagement rather be dismissed at a later date by the audit committee. Alternatively, however, if investors view a resignation differently and assign blame to management rather than the auditor, we could observe a negative investor reaction to a resignation, in contrast to a positive reaction to a dismissal. The results in
Panel B of Table 6 , however, show that the coefficient on RSGN is statistically insignificant suggesting that the market does not distinguish between a resignation and a dismissal.
42
CONCLUSION
Restatements and auditor changes, both, are events that draw enormous public attention. Restatements constitute a failure of the accounting and audit functions to produce reliable financial statements, creating the need for changes in the firm's 42 We also estimate the model using just the dismissal firms and find qualitatively similar results (results untabulated). However, the model using just resignation firms did not have a good fit (i.e., negative adjusted R-squared and a statistically insignificant F-value for the model).
governance mechanisms. One aspect of governance that is destabilized by a restatement is the relationship between restating firms and their auditors.
In support, we find that disclosures of restatements are positively correlated with auditor switches in the following year. This result holds after controlling for previously identified determinants of auditor changes. We find that restatements due to technical reasons-namely those not related to auditing and financial reporting failures-do not lead to auditor changes, reinforcing our argument that only substantive financial misstatements result in a separation between auditor and client.
As the severity of restatements increases, so does the likelihood of auditor changes. Specifically, we find that as the impact of a restatement on net income and the company's stock price become more negative, the likelihood of an auditor change increases. We also find that restating firms with more effective corporate governance are more likely to switch auditors, possibly to restore market confidence that has been lost due to the lack of audit oversight. Finally, we argue that the benefits to a firm from changing auditors can be expected to increase as the severity of a restatement increases.
Consistent with this, we find that stock market returns around the auditor turnover dates are positively related to the severity of a restatement. Future research could further explore this issue by examining whether there are differences in the quality of financial reporting of restating firms that changed auditors and those that did not. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance respectively, using two-tailed tests. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. The quality of governance is measured using an index suggested by DeFond et al. (2005) . High (low) quality governance is above (below) the median value of the index. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance, respectively using two-tailed tests.
Variable Definition
CARAC
Three day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the auditor switch date; CARREST Three-day abnormal market returns surrounding restatement announcement date; RESTAMT Cumulative earnings effect of the restatement scaled by total assets as of the fiscal year-end prior to the restatement announcement; RPTE Number of reportable events disclosed upon an auditor change; Q4 1 if a firm switches its auditor in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise; RSGN 1 if the predecessor auditor resigns, and 0 otherwise; NONBIG 1 if the firm was audited by a non-Big N auditor, and 0 otherwise; SIZE Natural logarithm of the market value of equity; and GC 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion, and 0 otherwise.
